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Abstract 
 
Open-end real estate funds are of particular importance in the German bank-
dominated financial system. However, recently the German open-end fund industry 
came under severe distress which triggered a broad discussion of required 
regulatory interventions. This paper gives a detailed description of the institutional 
structure of these funds and of the events that led to the crisis. Furthermore, it 
applies recent banking theory to open-end real estate funds in order to understand 
why the open-end fund structure was so prevalent in Germany. Based on these 
theoretical insights we evaluate the various policy recommendation that have been 
raised.  
 
 
  1 Introduction
Open-end real estate funds are indirect real estate investment vehicles that are of particular
importance in Germany.1 Shares are directly backed by the properties and liquid assets
held by the fund. In contrast to a closed fund structure, an open-end investment fund
continuously creates new shares on demand. Investors can buy shares at net asset value
from the fund and may redeem them on a daily basis at the prevailing net asset value, which
can be higher or lower than the initial price at which the investors bought. Consequently,
even though shares are typically not traded on a secondary market, they are a highly
liquid investment.2 The price is quoted once a day based on the regular valuations of the
properties and liquid assets at that time. Since the regular valuations are typically done
only once a year on a rolling basis for each property, the redemption value of a fund's
shares adjusts slowly to changes in the market price of the underlying properties.
In contrast to the experience in other countries, in Germany this fund construction
showed a remarkable degree of stability until recently. However, in December 2005 the
closure of Deutsche Bank's open-end real estate fund Grundbesitz Invest triggered a cred-
ibility crisis in this industry that put the stability of most of these funds at risk. In the
public debate on how to solve this crisis and prevent future ones, several proposals have
been raised. In this paper, we try to evaluate these recommendations.
In order to do so, we ¯rst analyze why the open-end structure of real estate funds was
particularly prevailing in Germany. Interestingly, applying recent banking theory to this
issue we ¯nd that there might have been good reasons for choosing an open-end structure
that is fragile and susceptible to credibility crises. Based on the reasons that might have led
to the emergence of open-end funds in Germany in the ¯rst place, we analyze the measures
proposed to increase their resilience. We ¯nd that some of the recommended measures that
are meant to improve liquidity control, valuation procedures and transparency are actually
counterproductive and may increase the funds' susceptibility to crises even further.
Our analysis departs from a detailed examination of international experiences with
open-end real estate funds in section 2. Section 3 focuses on the institutional and regula-
tory design of open-end property funds in Germany and emphasizes the incentive structure
that arises between investors, fund managers and fund owners. Section 4 evaluates dif-
ferent theoretical arguments why this incentive structure might have been so successful
1For example, see Maurer (2004) and Klug (2004) for a description of open-end real estate funds and
their importance in Germany.
2For some funds there also exists a small secondary market located at certain regional exchanges in
Germany. However, these markets are not very liquid and the trading of shares on these exchanges will
typically be suspended in crisis situations.
2in the German bank-dominated ¯nancial system. However, we also point out its innate
drawbacks. In section 5 we try to link this dark side of open-end property funds to the
observed troubles in Germany at the end of 2005, particularly to the closure of Deutsche
Bank's fund Grundbesitz Invest. While sections 4 and 5 only take the view of an in-
dividual fund, section 6 discusses the disadvantages of the open-end structure from the
industry's perspective by taking di®erent externalities into account. Corroborating the
relevance of these externalities, section 7 describes the onset of a widespread credibility
crisis of open-end property funds after the closure of DB real estates Grundbesitz Invest.
In particular, it discusses the chronology of events that led to the closure of another fund
in the course of the crisis. Based on these ¯ndings, section 8 tries to derive some policy
recommendations and evaluates the most important proposals raised in the aftermath of
the funds' demise.
2 Open-end Real Estate Funds - An International Compar-
ison
In the late 1980s, the Dutch fund RODAMCO was one of the largest real estate funds in
the world.3 It was owned by Robeco Group, at that time the largest independent European
investment group that managed funds. Robeco followed a policy of tacitly guaranteeing
fund prices. Thus, for 11 years prior to September 1990, Robeco bought back shares of
Rodamco at net asset value from any investor wishing to sell. Low interest rates in the late
1980s made an investment in RODAMCOs shares particulary interesting, since it o®ered
a return of about 3 percent higher than a bank deposit. Due to the open structure, a large
°ow of speculative capital into the fund resulted. At this time, the fund had about three
quarters of its assets invested in the US and UK real estate market.
In 1990, however, the rise of interest rates caused a high out°ow of capital. At the
same time, the US-market - and thus RODAMCOs portfolio - was a®ected by a severe
drop in real estate prices. This should have had an adverse impact on RODAMCO's share
price, because in an open-end structure the unit price is determined by dividing the total
asset value of property and cash by the number of units. Given the standard valuation
rule in place in the Netherlands at that time, however, stating that all fund properties are
only appraised simultaneously once at the end of the ¯scal year, investors could predict
that the redemption price was going to su®er a severe decline at a future point in time,
i.e. the end of the year 1990. In that situation it was individually optimal for investors
to redeem their shares before and buy them back after the re-appraisal. Hence, arbitrage
3See also Sebastian and Tyrell (2006) for a more detailed description.
3had become possible, and that is what investors did on a large scale in September 1990.4
Robeco, however, reacted by suspending its traditional policy of buying back shares when
asked to do so by investors. Eventually, severe liquidity problems forced the management
to transform the fund into a stock-listed closed fund.5
A similar crisis occurred at about the same time in the Australian open-end real estate
funds market. In particular after the stock market crash of 1987, which caused a strong
increase in property prices, the Australian real estate market saw huge in°ows of capital.
This surge was supported even further by the credit policy of Australian banks, which
lent out loans collateralized by real estate at exceptionally low interest rates. When the
central bank tightened monetary policy, property prices dropped by around 60%.6 This,
in turn, caused a run by investors in order to redeem their shares of open-end real estate
funds. To avoid a collapse of those investment vehicles, the government decided to stop all
redemptions for a period of 12 months and forced all funds to list on the stock exchange
(Little, 1992).
In Switzerland the ¯rst open-end real estate fund was founded as early as 1938. Switzer-
land was also one of the ¯rst countries to introduce a regulation for open-end property
funds in 1967. Facing irregularities with redemption prices in 1991, the authorities adapted
the regulations codi¯ed in the \Anlagefondsgesetz"(AFG). According to these criteria, re-
demptions are only possible after a notice of termination within a twelve months period
before the end of the ¯scal year (art. 42 AFG). This requirement should ensure that
the fund management has enough time to acquire su±cient liquidity if necessary. On the
other hand, the depository bank has to organize a continuous trade of shares, in general
by trading on the stock exchange. As a result of the new regulations, most of the trading
takes place at the stock exchange and Swiss open-end real estate funds do neither emit nor
redeem units in relevant amounts. Consequently, Swiss open-end funds are comparable to
stock-listed closed funds with a limited redemption possibility.7
Summarizing these international experiences, open-end real estate funds in all these
countries did not survive as a successful investment class because of their inherent fragility.
Crisis events in the real estate market forced legislators to transform these investment
vehicles into a closed-end structure in order to avoid a run phenomenon that could trigger
4Of course, selling shares and buying them back after a short time period always involves transaction
costs. However, in the situation described above the expected price drop outweighed transaction costs,
making such a strategy pro¯table despite the involved costs.
5See Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993), Helmer (1997) and Lee (2000) for more details.
6See Allen and Gale (2000) for a theoretical explanation of asset price bubbles related to an ine±cient
expansion of credit caused by risk shifting behavior of the banking sector.
7As emissions only take place occasionally, Hoesli (1993) refers to these funds as \semi closed-end".
4further uncertainties in the ¯nancial sector. In addition, the ¯nancial structure of the
respective countries obviously had a strong in°uence on the di®erent characteristics of
open-end real estate funds.
3 The Institutional Design of Open-End Real Estate Funds
in Germany
German open-end real estate funds were the only exception internationally to have been
very successful for almost 50 years. One reason for this may be found in the speci¯c
regulatory and institutional design of the German funds. Let us ¯rst explore the regulatory
design. In setting up the German Investment Companies Act in 1969 (\Investmentgesetz
(InvG)"), the regulation comprised a number of measures to limit the risk of liquidity
crises despite funds' obligation of daily redemption of shares. One of the most important
measures in this respect requires German real estate funds to hold at least 5% of their
assets in cash, with a maximum of 50% allowed. Until the crisis of 2005/2006, the funds
held 25-49% of their assets in cash or bonds. Furthermore, the funds are allowed to
maintain a leverage of up to 50% of their real estate assets' value. In addition, they can
delay the repurchase of units for a period up to two years in case of high liquidity out°ows.
However, since 1959 this possibility of last resort has never been used until 2005.8
In addition, di®erent elements of the investment practice and valuation process also im-
proved funds' resilience against liquidity crisis even if they were not initially implemented
for that reason. One such element is the o®ering charge of usually 5% which becomes
due on buying a share of an open-end real estate fund. Originally designated for covering
distribution costs, these built-in transaction costs create an e®ective barrier to reduce the
attractiveness of frequent transactions and thereby limit arbitrage opportunities. Further-
more, due to the o®ering charge, the necessary investment horizon to achieve a positive
return increases to at least one year on average.
Another important aspect that represents a somewhat unique feature of the German
funds' design relates to the process of evaluating the funds' assets. While ¯nancial assets
are valued according to their market prices, the value of each property in the fund's
portfolio is based on an appraisal by experts. Under the Investment Companies Act, the
funds are required to have their property assets valued by an independent panel of experts
each time they acquire or sell a property. Additionally, the whole portfolio has to be
evaluated on a rolling basis every 12 months. Hence, the appraisal of the funds' properties
8For a further description of the institutional framework of German open-end funds see Maurer and
Sebastian (2002), Maurer (2004) and Maurer, Reiner, and Rogalla (2005).
5takes place at di®erent dates during the ¯scal year, which results in a staggered valuation
process. As a consequence, the e®ect of a change in asset values on the redemption prices
is smoothed and discrete jumps in the redemption rate creating arbitrage opportunities for
investors are limited. Further smoothing is accomplished via the valuation methods. As
has been emphasized by Maurer, Reiner, and Rogalla (2005), property appraisals tend to
lag movements in the property market and understate the true volatility of returns in the
underlying property values. This may be the result of appraisal \anchoring" to previous
evaluations, aggregation of information over time, and the use of valuation methods based
on yield analysis instead of cash °ows - a procedure which in general will be considered
as hardly market-based.9
Of at least the same importance is the institutional framework in which the German
open-end real estate funds are embedded. By law, only an investment fund management
company (\Kapitalanlagegesellschaft") is allowed to manage open-end real estate funds.
The investment fund management company is typically set up in the legal form of a limited
liability company and usually manages several di®erent mutual funds, not only open-end
property funds. From a legal perspective, the open-end fund itself is a special asset pool
funded by the investors' contribution on an open-end basis, which must be strictly sep-
arated from the other funds and the investment company's own assets. Interestingly, in
Germany the shareholders of these investment fund management companies are mostly
commercial banks and insurance companies and are therefore not identical with the in-
vestors holding the open-end property funds' shares.
By the end of 2005, 31 open-end funds were managed by 16 investment management
companies registered in Germany. These funds had more than EUR 85 billion assets under
management, which amounts to more than 15.5% of the total managed by German mutual
funds. This ¯gure went up from EUR 47 billion in 2000, averaging a net cash in°ow in these
5 years of more than EUR 7 billion. Because most of the funds are owned by commercial
banks, it comes as no surprise that around 70% of all fund sales are brokered by banks,
which use their network of branches throughout Germany as distribution channel.
Along with the huge capital in°ow of the last years, the investor structure has changed
substantially. Even though private investors, who were searching for less risky assets after
the stock market crash in 2001, invested heavily into open-end property funds, particularly
institutional investors turned to this type of fund in recent years as an alterative to money
market funds - despite the fact that open-end property funds were traditionally set up
mainly for private investors.10 Interestingly, institutional investors were not required to
9See also Morgan (1998) and McParland, Adair, and McGreal (2002) for a similar assessment.
10In Germany, apart from public open-end real estate funds also special property funds exist, which are
6pay the o®ering charge of 5%. Hence, they did not have to bear the built-in transaction
costs when moving in and out of these funds.
Examining the historical risk-return pro¯le of open-end real estate funds in Germany
over the period 1980-2002, we ¯nd that, in comparison to equity and bonds, real estate
funds exhibited by far the lowest volatility. The average nominal respectively real return
on real estate funds was clearly below the average return on equity, but only slightly
lower than the return on bonds. On a yearly basis, between 1959 and 2004 open-end real
estate funds yielded an average return of about 4%, without a single year displaying a
negative performance (Klug, 2004). For that reason, in recent years some open-end real
estate funds actually advertised an implicit promise to investors of a yearly return of at
least 3%. Thus, in summary, open-end real estate funds in Germany exhibit risk-return
characteristics that are di®erent from any other asset class and that make them attractive
both for institutional and private investors.11
4 Theoretical Arguments for Open-End Real Estate Funds
4.1 Liquidity Insurance
In the aftermath of the severe stock market crash in 2001, investors developed a strong
awareness of the liquidity risk associated with long-term though marketable investments
like stocks and investment fund shares. Thus, one of the main sales argument for open-end
real estate funds, that contributed to their take-o® immediately after the stock markets
crashed, was the guaranteed redemption of fund shares and the fact that the staggered
evaluation of underlying assets promised a very moderate volatility of the redemption rates.
The open-end structure of real estate funds hence o®ered investors a liquidity insurance.
Similar to the argument that Diamond and Dybvig (1983) develop for bank deposits,
investors' demand for liquidity insurance might result from the fact that, by the time
of their investment decision, investors do not know exactly when they will actually need
their funds back. Risk-avers investors will therefore prefer an investment product that
provides them with comparably smooth repayments irrespective of whether they redeem
their funds early or late. By holding parts of the portfolio in liquid but less pro¯table
assets, open-end real estate funds can promise a rather high redemption in the short-run
at the expense of returns to long-term investors which remain below the average long-term
designated for a limited number, i.e. up to 10, of institutional investors. These special funds are usually
managed by the same investment companies that o®er also public open-end property funds.
11See also Maurer, Reiner, and Rogalla (2005), who provide an in-depth analysis of the risk-return pro¯le
of German open-end real estate funds.
7yield on pure property investments. Thus, ex-post those investors that happen to hold
their shares relatively long implicitly cross-subsidize the higher short-term repayment to
those investors that turn out to require their funds back earlier. Since funds' share holders
are assumed to be risk avers, this liquidity insurance is ex-ante appreciated by investors
and is welfare enhancing.
Following the argument of Qi (1994), originally developed for the case of bank deposits,
the costs of this liquidity insurance obviously decline if the fund can expect additional
liquidity in°ow in the short-run from issuing new shares. The fund then needs to hold
fewer liquid and low-return assets as insurance against the expected early redemption of
impatient investors. Still, the costs of this liquidity insurance to long-term investors, i.e.
the implicit cross-subsidy paid by long-term investors, are apparently increasing in the
average fraction of investors redeeming their fund shares early. Put di®erently, the shorter
the average holding period of fund shares, the lower is the average return that these funds
can promise.
The increased engagement in property funds by institutional investors who used open-
end real estate funds as a substitute for money market funds to store liquidity, dramatically
reduced average investment horizons in these property funds. The higher short-run yield
that institutional investors realized in these open-end property funds as compared to
money market investments were essentially borne by small investors with generally longer
investment horizons. This undermined the e±ciency of the liquidity insurance provided
by these funds.
The staggered adjustment of the redemption rates to changes in the market value
of the property held by the fund also enabled open-end real estate funds to o®er an
intertemporal smoothing of asset price shocks to its long-term investors. Following the
mechanism described by Allen and Gale (1997) for the banking industry, the staggered
adjustment of the redemption rate allows open-end property funds to build up reserves in
times of increasing asset prices. These reserves can be used to stabilize the redemption rate
above the market value of the fund's underlying assets in periods of declining asset prices.
Thus, given risk averse investors, the funds' ability to intertemporarily smooth shocks
allows them to o®er an additional e±ciency enhancing insurance. However, this insurance
function of open-end funds is again undermined by institutional investors. Succumbing to
lower transaction costs typically, they can exploit intertemporal arbitrage opportunities
that the intertemporal smoothing of property price shocks by open-end real estate funds
generates.
84.2 Liquidity Transformation as Disciplining Device
Even though the liquidity insurance provision of open-end real estate funds might have
contributed to the emergence of these investment products, it is unlikely that this has
been the only factor. Particularly the observation that open-end property funds play a
truly dominant role only in Germany cannot be explained by this universal e±ciency gain.
A probably more convincing argument for the long-lasting success of open-end real
estate funds in Germany can be made with regard to the disciplining role involved with
this ¯nancing instrument. This argument is based on the idea that redeemable claims
serve a control function, an idea that can be traced back to Fama and Jensen (1983). In
banking theory particularly Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001)
emphasize that re¯nancing illiquid assets with liquid liabilities{like deposits{held by mul-
tiple investors can serve as a disciplining device for the bank management. The fragile
structure due to the liquidity transformation allows the bank manager to credibly refrain
from moral hazard.12 This is due to the fact that each individual investor has an in-
centive to redeem his deposits as soon as he perceives any misbehavior of the manager.
If he withdraws his funds immediately, he receives the face value of his deposits. If he
waits, in contrast, the bank might not be able to repay due to the manager's misbehavior.
Moreover, knowing that many other depositors have the same incentive to withdraw, each
investor can anticipate that the bank will run out of liquidity. If the bank has to liquidate
long-term assets in order to satisfy depositors' demand, this will reduce the expected re-
payment of a depositor holding on to his claim even further. Thus, information about a
misbehavior of the management serves as a signal for depositors to run which eventually
forces the fund into default. Assuming that the manager is dismissed in the event of such
a crisis and assuming that his bene¯ts from misbehavior in the short-run are overcom-
pensated by expected future bene¯ts from being in o±ce, he will try to avoid a crisis and
refrain form moral hazard.
Similar to bank deposits in the argument of Diamond and Rajan (2001), an open-
end fund's redemption guarantee serves as an e±cient and timely disciplining device. In
contrast to other control mechanisms, the liquidity transformation and the associated risk
of a run does not presuppose sophisticated investors, who have to monitor the management
of the fund - a time-consuming and di±cult exercise because of the long-term horizon of
investments and the complexities in evaluating real estate assets. Fund managers who
12Similarly, Goodhart (1987) argues that the characteristic role of banks is that they{in order to reduce
informational frictions{use ¯xed-term liabilities to re¯nance ¯xed-term lending with a repayment proba-
bility that is di±cult to assess for outsiders. He also points out that this e±ciency enhancing combination
at the same time makes banks vulnerable to crisis and creates the need for a lender of last resort.
9anticipate the risk of a run will behave well accordingly, thereby giving investors no reason
to run, even though in principle they have an informational advantage with respect to the
fund's properties, which they otherwise could use to "hold up" investors.
Given these advantages of the open-end fund construction in terms of disciplining
managers, the question arises why open-end real estate funds survived successfully only
in Germany. One of the main reasons may be the particular severity of potential con°icts
of interest between fund management and fund investors in Germany. As mentioned in
Section 3, most funds in Germany are originated and owned by investment management
companies which themselves are owned by banks, especially universal banks. This is
a unique institutional feature of German funds. Since these universal banks do not only
own investment management companies managing a variety of di®erent types of funds, but
usually hold further business relations with property development companies and property
dealers, they may have both the possibility to reshu²e assets at low transaction costs and
the incentive to do so. The only e®ective disciplining device of open-end property funds'
investors, consequently, is the option to withdraw funds on a short-term basis and hence
to \vote" by feet.
However, real returns on properties are uncertain. It is therefore important to also take
into account the possibility of return deteriorations that are not caused by misbehavior
on the part of the fund's management. As has been shown by Diamond and Rajan (2000)
for the capital structure of bank, in a world with uncertain returns on long-term assets
the choice of a pure deposit re¯nancing might be too rigid.13 Such a capital structure
precipitates runs when real asset values fall even without opportunistic behavior on the
part of the bank's management. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that it is therefore
optimal for banks to partially ¯nance with a softer claim, i.e. equity. Such a soft claim
bu®ers the fund against exogenous shocks to asset values.
Because the open-end fund itself is a special asset pool funded solely by the investors'
contributions, a softer capital structure cannot be achieved. Yet, exogenous shocks to
the property returns can be smoothed by holding liquidity bu®ers. Such excess liquidity
holdings help to survive situations in which the cash °ow from property returns falls
short and the available liquidity is therefore insu±cient to serve the usual and expected
redemption of shares.
In addition, an implicit promise given by the bank-owner to the fund's share holders
reduces the risk of runs due to asset deteriorations. Such a guarantee to provide liquidity
assistance in an emergency has to be implicit, so that it can be waived in case of misbe-
13See also Sebastian and Tyrell (2006), who analyze the advantages of open-end real estate funds'
liquidity risk based on Allen and Gale (1998) and come to similar conclusions.
10havior. Yet, it provides a bu®er against smaller shocks to the asset value. Furthermore,
it has to be partial, because otherwise the disciplining function of runs and therefore the
advantage of the open-end construction would be lost. As a consequence, for larger asset
price shocks the risk of fundamental based crises due to asset price deteriorations is still
unavoidable.
4.3 Liquidity Crises { The Unintended Consequences of Liquidity Trans-
formation
As has already become apparent in the previous section, the liquidity transformation
of open-end funds makes them fragile and susceptible to severe crises. Particularly the
combination with the intertemporal smoothing of property price shocks due to the speci¯c
valuation procedure makes these funds vulnerable in times of deteriorating returns from
property investments. If the cash °ow from real estate investments declines, it becomes
more and more di±cult for open-end property funds to re¯nance the usual redemption of
shares. Moreover, if property prices deteriorate, arbitrage opportunities arise due to the
staggered evaluation of the funds' properties. After a decline in real estate prices, investors
can therefore anticipate a reduction of the redemption rate. Particularly institutional
investors who typically face lower transaction costs have an incentive to withdraw their
funds shortly before the devaluation in order to reinvest them after the devaluation. The
arbitrage pro¯ts that they can realize from this strategy, however, absorb liquidity held
by the funds.If the liquidity shortage is severe enough, this may force the real estate fund
to sell o® property below book value, leading to a further reduction of the redemption
rate. Consequently, even those investors who initially were not in need of liquidity or who
were unable to realize arbitrage pro¯ts, eventually have an inventive to withdraw, thereby
aggravating the liquidity crisis additionally.
However, apart from these \fundamentally-driven" crises, the liquidity transformation
of open-end funds also brings about the risk of self-ful¯lling liquidity crisis, i.e. purely
expectation-driven collapses. Due to the liquidity transformation the mere anticipation
of a su±ciently severe redemption of shares by other investors may lead to the eventual
closure of the fund - even if the fund's fundamental value did not deteriorate at all. As
shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for depository institutions, investors expecting se-
vere withdrawals of funds will also anticipate that the ¯nancial intermediary may be forced
to sell o® long-term assets below book value in order to obtain additional liquidity. Since
these \¯re sales" reduce future cash °ows, investors must also anticipate that the redemp-
tion rate will drop, which decreases the value of their claims. Thus, investors expecting
a large-scale withdrawal of fund shares have an incentive to redeem their units. Conse-
11quently, anticipating a strong amount of withdrawal from other investors, each individual
investor will rationally withdraw his money as well, thereby vindicating the initial belief
on which his action was based.14
Technically speaking, the liquidity transformation function of open-end property funds
induces the possibility of multiple equilibria. Depending solely on investors' expectations,
there may prevail either an (ine±cient) crisis equilibrium or an (e±cient) equilibrium,
in which the ¯nancial intermediary remains stable. Interestingly, this case of multiple
equilibria - of which neither outcome can be predicted with certainty - necessarily requires
that investors are aware of the fund's fundamental value lying in an intermediate range of
values: the fund's fundamental value may not so sound that the fund will never be closed,
irrespective of investors' behavior, nor so bad that the fund will certainly be closed.
One of the main disadvantages of the theory on self-ful¯lling crises is its inability to
predict which of the two equilibria will be realized. In order to ¯ll this explanatory gap,
it has been argued that market participants may coordinate their actions according to
so-called sunspots, i.e. unrelated events that may lead investors to believe one of the two
outcomes to be more probable than the other. Recent analytical work on coordination
games has shown, however, that investors' behavior is not necessarily only in°uenced by
unpredictable sunspots. Rather, their behavior is crucially a®ected by the structure of
information about the fundamental value (in our case, about the fund's assets) that they
dispose of. Referring to the results of the literature on \global games"15, it has been
shown that investors' behavior is predictable, i.e. they choose a uniquely optimal strategy
even for intermediate fundamental values, if they possess very precise private information,
relative to the precision of publicly-available information (Morris and Shin (2002); Metz
(2002)). In this respect, public information is de¯ned as pieces of information that are
known to all investors and that are known to be known to all investors and so forth.
Hence, provided that investors' private information about the fund is su±ciently pre-
cise, the uncertainty stemming from self-ful¯lling crises may be avoided. In this case,
investors will redeem their shares only if the fund's fundamental value is perceived to be
14Of course, this mechanism works in both directions, i.e. if an investor believes that other investors are
not going to redeem their shares, this reduces his incentive to do so, thereby vindicating his initial belief
because his behavior, in turn, reduces other investors' incentives to redeem their shares.
15In a global game, players observe a noisy private signal about the game's payo®, which itself is de-
termined by a random draw from a given class of games (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993). In the case
of open-end property funds, investors do not know their investment's payo® with certainty. Rather, they
try to assess the payo® by taking into account any information that may be given to them. Additionally,
their behavior itself in°uences the payo® since the probability of the fund's closure increases in the num-
ber of investors that withdraw their money. In this sense, the interaction between investors represents a
\coordination game".
12su±ciently bad. In any other case, investors will not be tempted to foreclose their invest-
ment only based on the anticipation that others will withdraw. In other words, there will
not be a run that - in a self-ful¯lling prophecy - leads to a closure of the fund without any
fundamental cause. Furthermore, since the occurrence of a crisis can be predicted in this
case, measures may be taken to prevent it.16
What can we learn from the theory on global games with regard to the risk of liquidity
crises of open-end real estate funds? Due to the very speci¯c nature of investment and the
mentioned evaluation complexities, it is certainly di±cult for investors to obtain precise
private information about the fund's assets. This holds even more for private investors
who, compared with institutional investors, lack the ¯nancial resources to maintain an own
research department. Publicly obtainable information therefore remains very important
to bridge the informational gap between the fund's management and, particularly private,
investors. If this information is very precise, there is a high risk that an interval arises
in which self-ful¯lling crises become possible, which may lead to the ine±cient closure of
a fund, that would still have been viable had only more investors decided not to redeem
their shares. If public information is less precise, global games theory predicts a closure
of a fund only if the fund's asset values are su±ciently low.
Due to the important role that public information plays, we may state that both the
success and the demise of the market for open-end property funds seem to follow self-
stabilizing paths. As long as the fund's shares are seen as pro¯table investments, for
instance because of a successful development of the fund's share prices, this anticipation
leads to even more capital in°ows into the funds, thereby corroborating its stability. If,
however, one fund is perceived to be distressed, this may be taken as a negative public
signal about the general development of real estate assets, leading to severe out°ows of
capital, thereby in a contagious process endangering also other open-end property funds.
The fact that observations of other funds' success or failure are public information to
investors and hence may strongly in°uence their behavior may both be strengthened or
alleviated by the services of public information providers, such as rating agencies. We will
16Note that a crisis event may still be ine±cient, i.e. it might have been prevented had only su±ciently
many investors decided not to redeem their shares. The di®erence to the purely expectations-driven
liquidity crises lies in the fact that not all investors choose the same action, i.e. either all redeem their
shares or no one does. Rather, the proportion of investors deciding on a withdrawal of money may lie
between 0 and 1, but may still be ine±ciently high relative to the fundamental value of the fund. These
ine±ciencies in run-equilibria have also been pointed out by Rochet and Vives (2004) and Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005) for the case of banking crises. However, a self-ful¯lling liquidity crises will always be
ine±cient, a crisis result stemming from a unique equilibrium in a global game does not necessarily have
to be ine±cient.
13return to this argument in section 6.
As already noted by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) an e±cient measure to prevent self-
ful¯lling liquidity crises is the suspension of convertibility of shares. However, this measure
automatically cuts the disciplining e®ect that the full-redemption of shares exerts on the
fund's management. As has already been mentioned above, it has to be weighed carefully
therefore, which of the two risks is more severe: the risk of management-misbehavior or
the probability of a run. In the latter case, we additionally have to distinguish between
a fundamentally-caused liquidity crisis leading to the e±cient closure of the fund, or a
self-ful¯lling crisis resulting in the closure of an otherwise viable fund. This distinction
will be taken up again in the next section that describes the closure of the ¯rst open-end
real estate fund in Germany, Deutsche Bank's Grundbesitz Invest.
5 The Trigger of the Open-End Property Funds Crisis in
Germany
Following the declining yields on commercial real estate in Germany many open-end prop-
erty funds came under pressure in 2004 and 2005. In several cases, the banks holding the
respective investment management companies stepped in to provide liquidity and bu®ered
a devaluation of the redemption rate. Prominent examples were Deka Bank, HypoVere-
insbank, and Commerzbank.
In contrast, on December 11, 2005, Deutsche Bank announced that due to property
price developments an unscheduled evaluation of its biggest ($7:2 billion) real estate
fund, Grundbesitz Invest, was unavoidable and would very likely lead to a devaluation
of the redemption price. The following severe withdrawal of funds absorbed most of the
fund's liquidity and forced Deutsche Bank to freeze redemption and close the fund un-
til further notice. At ¯rst sight, the troubles of Grundbesitz Invest looked like a typical
fundamentally-caused crisis, stemming from overvalued assets.
After the closure of the fund, the general problems of the German real estate funds in-
dustry were analyzed extensively in public. Despite the general awareness that the biggest
°aw of open-end real estate funds lies in their promise of immediate liquidity to investors
while being tied-up in illiquid assets, the public wondered why Deutsche Bank announced
the freezing of its fund without any obvious cause. Due to the staggered valuation process,
a substantial part of the fund's assets had undergone a thorough evaluation just recently.
Without any exogenous event suggesting a severe shock to the value of the fund's assets,
liquidity transformation should not have been much of a problem. Even more surprising
was Deutsche Bank's announcement of not taking the usual steps of using own resources to
14secure the fund - especially since there were signs that the commercial real estate market
was already improving at the time. Instead, Deutsche Bank simply o®ered a fair com-
pensation to a sub-group of investors (that had invested in the fund within the last two
years), not even to all investors.
This behavior stood in stark contrast, for instance, to the way Deka Bank, a large
investment branch of German savings banks, had handled the distress of its own open-
end property fund a year earlier. As was usual for the banking industry in Germany,
Deka bailed out its fund by buying su±ciently many of the distressed shares. Obviously,
Deutsche Bank had reasons for choosing to behave di®erently. Rumors were abound that
Deutsche Bank was pushing for a governmental approval to create exchange-traded real
estate investment trusts (REITS) as a new investment product and, therefore, did not
care too much about the prospects of open-end property funds.
The di®erence in behavior between Deka Bank and Deutsche Bank may be ascribed
to the trade-o® between maximization of reputational capital at the expense of ¯nancial
capital, and vice versa, that has been emphasized by Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993).
Whereas Deka Bank obviously chose to preserve the reputational capital of its own open-
end property fund by bailing it out, Deutsche Bank decided on the opposite strategy.
As Deutsche Bank seemed not to have much interest in the development of its open-end
property funds market, it did not value reputational capital in that segment very much.
Moreover, this di®erence in priorities may also be explained by the di®erent corporate
governance of the two banks. While Deutsche Bank's diverse international shareholders
are e±ciently enforcing pro¯t maximization, the public ownership might provide Deka
Bank with a fairly long-term horizon for e±ciency considerations.
Apart from the aspect of how Deutsche Bank behaved after the onset of the crisis as
compared to Deka Bank, there remains the question of whether the closure of Deutsche
Bank's Grundinvest fund was truly triggered by fundamental causes. It may be answered
with the help of the above mentioned theory of self-ful¯lling crises versus a unique crisis
outcome in the global games theory. If the theory of multiple equilibria - and hence of self-
ful¯lling crises - holds, the fund's demise took place within a rather uncertain market where
a sunspot-event decided on the realization of the closure of the fund. According to global
games theory, in contrast, the fund's freeze was the outcome of a unique equilibrium and
had to be expected with certainty once the value of the underlying assets became known.
Only in this respect could the crisis correctly be referred to as a fundamental-driven event.
In order to distinguish between the two theories, it is intriguing to examine more
closely the information available to the market at the time the crisis happened. It might
have been the case that the announcement of a revaluation of the fund's assets proved to
15be a su±ciently precise public signal to the market that the conditions for a self-ful¯lling
crisis were satis¯ed, without the fund itself being of su±ciently low quality to warrant
a \fundamental crisis". If this explanation holds, investors withdrew their money solely
because they expected others to do so as well and not because they believed the fund's
fundamental value to be su±ciently low. Hence, they coordinated on the ine±cient action
within a range of fundamental values where the e±cient continuation of the fund would
still have been possible. According to global games theory, in contrast, the observed
closure of Grundbesitz Invest presents a fundamental crisis because investors held su±-
ciently precise private information about the fund that convinced them of the low value
of the fund's assets. However, since ¯nally after the reevaluation period the redemption
price of Grundbesitz Invest shares was only reduced by 2.4 % when the fund was opened
again on March 3rd, one may seriously doubt that the crisis was indeed driven by private
information about a fundamental weakness of the fund.
6 Systemic Repercussions of Individual Crises and the Role
of Information
From a regulatory perspective the welfare implications of an individual open-end real
estate fund being in a crisis { even if it is as large as Deutsche Bank's Grundbesitz Invest
{ are negligible. Of far greater importance are the negative repercussions that the closure
of such an individual fund has on the entire industry. In several ways the crisis of an
individual institute can a®ect the stability of others, potentially leading to a collapse of
the entire industry.
A \fundamental" way of how an individual crisis may cause contagious e®ects is
through its in°uence on real estate prices. In reaction to the liquidity shortage, the trou-
bled fund has to sell o® large parts of its real estate portfolio. This absorbs liquidity from
the real estate market and depresses property prices. Similar to the channel of ¯nancial
contagion in the banking sector pointed out by Allen and Gale (2004) and Fecht (2004),
this may trigger liquidity crises of other funds, since at each point in time some funds
plan to raise liquidity in the market by selling parts of their real estate portfolio. Given
a severe drop in property prices, they will not be able to raise the expected amount of
liquidity from these transactions. This might cause a liquidity shortage at these initially
solid funds and induce them to sell o® additional assets, which creates a further downward
pressure on real estate prices.
A probably even more important self-enforcing mechanism leading to contagious e®ects
on other initially sound institutes may be induced by the e®ect of real estate market prices
16on investors' arbitrage opportunities. As has already been noted in pervious sections, due
to the staggered evaluation procedure the redemption price adapts slowly to declines in
property prices. Thus, investors observing a price decline can anticipate a reduction
in the redemption rate and realize arbitrage pro¯ts by withdrawing shortly before and
reinvesting shortly after the devaluation. As the arbitrage pro¯ts of investors absorb
funds' liquidity, it may even force previously stable funds to sell o® property below book
value to gather additional liquidity. Anticipating this e®ect, even those investors who are
unable to bene¯t from the arbitrage opportunity have an incentive to withdraw on a large
scale. Indeed, these e®ects have been emphasized by many practitioners who also pointed
to the comparably illiquid and concentrated market for commercial real estate in Germany
which makes these spill-overs through asset prices a particularly relevant phenomenon.17
But given the di±culties of private investors in assessing the development of the fun-
damental value of real estate funds, \informational" spill-overs of an individual fund's
collapse might have even more severe repercussions on other funds: Due to the opacity of
real estate funds' assets, investors dispose of only imprecise assessments of future returns
and default probabilities of individual funds. However, given that the portfolio structures
of di®erent real estate funds are in general very much alike, investors know that it is rather
unlikely that a shock a®ects only a single institution. Thus, the collapse of one real estate
fund serves as an indicator for investors holding shares of other real estate funds. Conse-
quently, observing that one fund is unable to redeem its shares, other funds' shareholders
trying to extract information from this observation will revise their expectations about
the soundness of their fund, which might increase their incentive to withdraw. Because
of the liquidity insurance that open-end real estate funds o®er, unexpected large-scale
withdrawals can trigger a self-ful¯lling liquidity crisis. Even sound real estate funds might
collapse simply due to the erroneous change in investors' sentiment following the crisis of
an individual fund. Thus, { similar to the mechanism emphasized by Chen (1999) with
regard to banking crises { the collapse of an individual fund can trigger informational
contagion of large parts of a fundamentally sound industry.
In contrast to this endogenous source of information, exogenous providers of informa-
tion, such as rating agencies, deliver accurate fundamental information about individual
funds' business perspectives to the public and hence perform a valuable task in reducing
the informational asymmetry between funds and investors. However, whether or not they
make the investment decision of shareholders more e±cient remains an open question. On
17For instance, T. Vorwerk from SÄ udprojekt, an independent rating agency, and M. Rothe from Stan-
dard & Poor's raised these concerns during the crisis of Deutsche Bank Grundbesitz Invest (Handelblatt,
Jannuary 1st, 2006).
17the one hand, they may reduce the sensitivity of investors to the fragility of other funds.
Disposing of more precise information about each individual fund, investors may rely to a
lower extent on the information that they extract from the observed collapse of one fund
with regard to the stability of other real estate funds. Consequently, by diminishing in-
formation asymmetries, rating agencies may substantially reduce the risk of informational
contagion between open-end real estate funds. Relying on the results of global games
theory, however, this ¯nding only holds if the rating information does not become com-
mon knowledge among all investors. In the context of real estate funds, this may be a
reasonable assumption, since the market for property fund ratings is rather fragmented,
and, unlike the market for credit ratings, is not divided among the \Big Three" agen-
cies (Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch). Moreover, as fund-ratings are not publicly
announced but usually sold to subscribers, a public dissemination of their content, for
instance in the newspapers, will solely follow an extreme rating assessment that naturally
leads to a response in the ¯nancial press.
If, however, the rating information does become common knowledge, the rating's e®ect
may be similar to the impact that credit rating agencies have been found to have on ¯rms
issuing debt. Focussing solely on the coordinating role of ratings due to their high degree
of publicity (in credit markets), Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) have shown that the
existence of a rating agency may lead to a reduction of uncertainty in investment behavior,
as it becomes easier for investors to anticipate the aggregate market outcome. In their
model, the existence of a rating agency therefore contributes to the prevalence of a unique
equilibrium. However, as Carlson and Hale (2005) show, ratings do not only coordinate
behavior but also bring new informational content to the market. They conclude that by
simultaneously ful¯lling both a coordination and an information function, rating agencies
may increase market uncertainty as multiple equilibria become more likely. Both papers,
however, lack a proper utility function for the rating agencies and simply assume that they
always try to generate a rating that reproduces the unknown credit quality as precisely as
possible, thereby maximizing the agencies' reputation.
In a recent paper, Bannier and Tyrell (2005) show that these earlier results do not
necessarily hold if a more complex utility function for a rating agency is introduced. In
particular, they assume that a rating agency not only tries to maximize her reputation
but also has to take into account competitive pressures from other information providers
and has to account for a potential feedback e®ect of her rating on the credit quality
of the rated ¯rm. These arguments seem to hold for the ratings of property funds as
well. In the real estate market, competition between rating agencies is particularly ¯erce
as market entry is not as strictly regulated as in the market for credit-ratings. Due to
18strong complementarities in investors' behavior following from the liquidity transformation
function that open-end property funds o®er, potential feedback e®ects from a fund's rating
on its liquidity situation and hence on its future business prospects are particularly obvious.
As has been shown by Bannier and Tyrell (2005), rating agencies that generate ratings
taking into account the above-mentioned utility arguments may potentially but do not
necessarily increase market uncertainties. While a rating announcement automatically
increases the precision of public information on the market and hence raises the risk of
self-ful¯lling crises, these may be prevented if investors have access to su±ciently precise
private information. However, as has already been mentioned, for the case of open-end
property funds this possibility is limited at least for private investors who were the main
target group for these funds. In this market, therefore, the existence of ratings, provided
that they become common information to all investors, may reasonably increase market
uncertainty and trigger ine±cient fund closures. The more precise the rating is, the easier
it becomes for investors to coordinate their actions, which increases the e®ect. This result
is strengthened by an interesting feature of fund ratings. While usually ratings simply
assess the quality of the fund's underlying assets on a relative scale, there are ratings that
additionally combine this quality assessment with a sell, hold or buy recommendation.
The latter combined type of ratings will certainly ease investors' coordination based on
the published rating, as such increasing the risk of self-ful¯lling crises.
An additional result by Bannier and Tyrell (2005) refers to the impact that the market
segregation between private and institutional investors has on a rating's in°uence. Usually,
institutional investors are required to invest only in assets or funds that are perceived to
be sound, i.e. in \investment grade" assets or \mÄ undelsichere Anlagen". These investment
constraints for institutional investors can be shown to increase the probability of a crisis,
i.e. of an ine±cient mass withdrawal of money, where the e®ect is strengthened by the
relative size of their investment.
7 The Spread of the Crisis in Germany
Indeed the closure of Deutsche Bank's Grundbesitz Invest caused a widespread crisis in
the market for open-end property funds in Germany, supporting the considerations of the
previous section. Particularly interesting was the evolvement of rating agencies in this
respect.
The closure of Deutsche Bank's Grundsbesitz Invest apparently raised doubts about
the stability of German open-end real estate funds in general and the question of whether
German banks will generally continue their practice of providing liquidity assistance to
19Figure 1: Monthly net liquidity in°ow to public open-end real estate funds in Germany
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0US real estate market. Despite the fact that even a full default of The Mills would only
have minor e®ects on KanAm's assets, Scope argued that negative reports about The Mills
might trigger liquidity out°ows from KanAm's funds that warrant a downgrade even of
KanAm Grundinvest, a fund that is not invested in US real estate, due to infection e®ects
between the funds.
KanAm responded to the rating downgrades by pointing out that Scope had not ob-
tained any data on the fund's assets from the fund's management, while a rating by Feri,
a rating agency based in Bad Homburg, only slightly earlier had announced an excellent
rating (AA) based on thorough private information about the fund. While the lack of pro-
prietary information usually leads a rating agency to dispense with a rating, Scope decided
to come forward with an assessment nonetheless. As Alexandra Merz later argued, Scope
was in a dilemma: either not to announce its knowledge about the negative information
about The Mills, risking not to be seen as a reliable source of information if the public
learned about the presumably deteriorating quality of KanAm's partner, or to announce
a negative assessment about KanAm's funds, thereby risking to act as a \multiplier",
leading to a self-ful¯lling prophecy. The latter is exactly what happened. Due to severe
liquidity out°ows, KanAm announced the freezing of its US fund on January 17, 2006.
Two days later, KanAm also had to close the much bigger KanAm Grundinvest fund.
Combining the demise of the KanAm funds with the closure of Deutsche Bank's
Grundbesitz Invest, we ¯nd that the former was de¯nitively not triggered by fundamental
reasons. In particular, KanAm US-Grundinvest was the most successful open-end property
fund in Germany at the time. It stands to reason therefore, which role the publication of
the negative rating assessments played for the observed development of KanAm's funds.
The fact that the Scope ratings were combined with a sell recommendation - a rather
unusual proceeding - certainly contributed to the high perceived precision of this piece of
public information.
This perception of a high precision of public information about the KanAm funds'
quality might exactly have been what triggered the crisis. As the KanAm funds did not
seem to be in a range where a crisis was inevitable, an interval might have opened up
where self-ful¯lling crises became possible. Since it is hardly possible to obtain any pre-
cise private information about the investments of real-estate funds, the perceived increase
in public information precision due to the rating announcement might reasonably have
triggered the possibility of multiple equilibria. Within the interval where self-ful¯lling
prophecies decide on the market outcome, Scope's negative information coordinated in-
vestors on the ine±cient decision to withdraw their money, which forced the closure of the
fund. Obviously, therefore, investors overreacted to the negative rating that was publicly
21available rather than searched for additional sources of private information. This overre-
action re°ects the dual role that public information seems to play on ¯nancial markets
due to strategic complementarities in investors' decisions. On the one hand, it conveys
informational content, on the other hand, however, it also coordinates investors' behavior.
As long as public information is su±ciently accurate, the latter e®ect might not distort the
market outcome away from the e±cient action that investors would have chosen had they
perfectly known the true fundamental value underlying the fund. However, if public infor-
mation is incorrect, it may coordinate behavior towards an ine±cient market outcome. In
the case of Scope's rating, information was certainly not very accurate as it was only based
on rumours and publicly available pieces of information and not on a thorough analysis
of the funds' data, even though it might have been perceived to be quite precise as it
was combined with a straightforward trade recommendation. The results were aggravated
by the fact that in particular institutional investors seem to have been heavily invested
in KanAm's funds and massively withdrew their money after the rating announcement.
Certainly this contributed to further withdrawals also by private investors that ¯nally led
to the closure of the funds.
8 Policy Recommendations
After the troubles of open-end property funds in Germany in December 2005 and Janu-
ary 2006, di®erent measures were recommended to improve the situation of these funds.
Policy recommendations mainly concentrated on three di®erent aspects: liquidity control,
valuation and transparency of funds.18 Our analysis of the di®erent functions and the
operational risk of open-end real estate funds allows us to evaluate most of these recom-
mendations in detail.
With regard to the control of liquidity, funds have been recommended to increase the
level of their liquidity reserves, to introduce a period of notice for large sales (above one
Mill. EUR) of the fund's shares combined with a discount on the redemption of shares
from institutional investors, to allow for transactions between various funds owned by one
company and to support the public trading of shares on a public exchange once a fund is
closed. According to the logic that we followed in section 4.2 of this paper, an increase
in liquidity requirements for real estate funds should be seen as counterproductive. It
not only reduces the returns that these funds can generate, but it also undermines the
disciplining e®ect of liquidity risk on the fund's management. However, larger liquidity
18On January 24, 2006, BVI published a whole package of measures believed to be necessary to improve
the funds' operations.
22bu®ers may alleviate the risk of a run on the fund: Higher liquidity reserves will reduce the
trigger of the fund's perceived value up to which investors will decide to sell their shares.
A discount on the redemption of large shares, i.e. from institutional investors, should
be e±ciency enhancing because the liquidity transformation provided to investors can be
improved (Diamond (1997)). Additionally, this measure strengthens the incentive of insti-
tutional market participants to invest in monitoring of the fund, because they cannot rely
on withdrawing before small investors do. Most importantly, the discount also limits the
scope for arbitrage opportunities for institutional investors in anticipation of a devaluation
of the redemption rate.
Finally, the closure of a fund may only be e±ciency enhancing if management is dis-
missed. Otherwise, the suspension of convertibility of shares into money or the creation
of a mutual insurance system eliminate the disciplining e®ect of liquidity transformation.
These measures might be counterproductive if they reduce ¯nancial fragility, which is
necessary for giving the right behavioral incentives in a complex institutional ¯nancial
environment like Germany, by too much. While a trade of shares on public exchanges in
the case of a closure of the fund should solve this problem, it has been found that the
few burses that allowed for trading of open-end property funds stopped trading once the
funds themselves were closed.
Regarding the frequency of evaluation the proposals recommend a shortening of the
period in which each unit has to be assessed to 6 month. With regard to the question of
how to evaluate the funds' assets, policy recommendations ask for a stronger emphasis of
a market-based evaluation. Up to now, due to the staggered valuation process, individual
assets are evaluated not very frequently. Most of a fund's assets hence enter the evaluation
process with an outdated price that is closer to historical costs than to the present market
values. Interestingly, recent research by Freixas and Tsomocos (2004) and Plantin, Sapra,
and Shin (2005) comes to the conclusion that under certain conditions, \book values"
might be much better suited to evaluate assets than \fair values". Even though the papers
depart from di®erent assumptions about the underlying market structure, both re°ect
the working of open-end property funds reasonably well. While Freixas and Tsomocos
(2004) argue that book value accounting is preferable if the evaluated entity is supposed
to smooth intertemporal consumption, Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2005) ¯nd that this is
true if the secondary market for the asset is relatively illiquid and claims are long-lived.
Obviously, it will be important to reduce the volatility of the fund's value by not allowing
for additional variability brought about by frequent changes due to a marking-to-market
evaluation program. However, while a shortening of the evaluation period and a stronger
orientation on current market prices limits the scope of open-end property funds to provide
23intertemporal smoothing it also limits at the same time arbitrage opportunities that arise
due to temporary deviations of the redemption price from the fundamental value of the
funds' assets.
Yet, shorter evaluation periods and a higher emphasis on market prices also increases
the transparency of a fund's fundamental value. Similarly, the proposed increase in the
independence of evaluation experts by forcing funds to change the appointed expert every
two years should improve transparency. Better information about the fundamental value of
each individual real estate fund reduces the risk of informational contagion since investors
to a lesser extent rely on information that they extract from another fund's failure. In
addition, greater transparency should also enable investors to exert direct control on the
funds management. This would reduce the need for a fragile capital structure that enables
investors to vote by feet in case of a bad fund performance.
An additional way to improve transparency is to foster the rating of open-end real
estate fund. Particularly solicited ratings might be an e±cient way to reduce the risk of
informational contagion and improve investors' control of fund managers. But whenever
a rating agency does not have access to private information about the fund, as has been
the case for Scope's KanAm rating, the rating will only display a coordination function,
which raises the risk of a liquidity crisis for the fund. Thus, in contrast to solicited ratings,
unsolicited ratings might actually increase the fragility of open-end property funds.
24 References
Allen, F., and D. Gale, 1997, \Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal
Smoothing," Journal of Political Economy, 105, 523{546.
Allen, F., and D. Gale, 1998, \Optimal Financial Crises," Journal of Finance, 53, 1245{
1284.
Allen, F., and D. Gale, 2000, \Bubbles and Crises," Economic Journal, 110, 236{255.
Allen, F., and D. Gale, 2004, \Financial Fragility, Liquidity and Asset Prices," Journal of
the European Economic Association, 2, 1015{1048.
Bannier, C., and M. Tyrell, 2005, \Modelling the Role of Credit Rating Agencies - Do They
Spark O® a Virtuous Circle?," Finance and Accounting Working Paper No., Goethe-
University Frankfurt.
Boot, A., T. Milbourn, and A. Schmeits, 2006, \Credit Ratings as Coordination Mecha-
nisms," Review of Financial Studies, 19, 81{118.
Boot, W., S. Greenbaum, and A. Thakor, 1993, \Reputation and Discretion in Financial
Contracting," American Economic Review, 83, 1165{1183.
Calomiris, C. W., and C. M. Kahn, 1991, \The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangments," American Economic Review, 81, 497{513.
Carlson, M., and G. Hale, 2005, \Courage to Capital? A Model of the E®ects of Rating
Agencies on Sovereign Debt Roll-Over," Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 1506.
Carlsson, H., and E. van Damme, 1993, \Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,"
Econometrica, 61, 989{1018.
Chen, Y., 1999, \Banking Panics: The Role of the First-Come, First-Served Rule and
Informational Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, 107, pp. 946{968.
Diamond, D., 1997, \Liquidity, Banks, and Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 105,
928{956.
Diamond, D., and R. Rajan, 2000, \A Theory of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, 55,
2431{2465.
Diamond, D., and R. Rajan, 2001, \Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial
Fragility: A Theory of Banking," Journal of Political Economy, 109, 287{327.
25Diamond, D. W., and P. H. Dybvig, 1983, \Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Journal of Political Economy, 91, 401{419.
Fama, E., and M. Jensen, 1983, \Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law
and Economics, 26, 327{349.
Fecht, F., 2004, \On the Stability of Di®erent Financial Systems," Journal of the European
Economic Association, 2, 969{1024.
Freixas, X., and D. Tsomocos, 2004, \Book vs. Fair Value Banking, and Intertemporal
Smoothing," Mimeo, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Goldstein, I., and A. Pauzner, 2005, \Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of
Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, 60, 1293{1328.
Goodhart, C. A. E., 1987, \Why Do Banks Need a Central Bank?," Oxford Economic
Papers, 39, 75{89.
Helmer, S., 1997, Die VermÄ ogensverwaltende Immobilien-KG mit Genu¼schein, Eu-
ropÄ aischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt/Main.
Hoesli, M., 1993, Investissement Immobilier et Diversi¯cation de Portefeuille, economica.
Klug, W., 2004, O®ene Immobilienfonds, Fritz Knapp Verlag.
Lee, S. L., 2000, \Property Funds and Flow," Working Paper in Land Management and
Development 02/00.
Little, A., 1992, \Changes for the Unlisted Property Trusts," The Valuer and Land Econo-
mist, pp. 166{170, 230.
Maurer, R., 2004, The German Financial System . chap. Institutional Investors in Ger-
many: Insurance Companies and Investment Funds, pp. 106{138, Oxford University,
Oxford.
Maurer, R., F. Reiner, and R. Rogalla, 2005, \Return and risk of German open-end real
estate funds," Journal of Property Research, 21, 209{233.
Maurer, R., and S. Sebastian, 2002, \In°ation Risk Analysis of European Real Estate
Securities," Journal of Real Estate Research, 24, 47{77.
McParland, C., A. Adair, and S. McGreal, 2002, \Valuation Standard - A Comparison of
four European Countries," Journal of Property Valuation and Investment, 20, 127{141.
26Metz, C., 2002, \Private and Public Information in Self-Ful¯lling Currency Crises," Jour-
nal of Economics, 76, 65{85.
Morgan, J. F., 1998, \The Natural History of Professionalization and Its E®ect of Valua-
tion Theory and Practice in the UK and Germany," Journal of Property Valuation and
Investment, 16, 185{206.
Morris, S., and H. Shin, 2002, \Social Value of Public Information," American Economic
Review, 52, 1521{1534.
Plantin, G., H. Sapra, and H. Shin, 2005, \Marking-to-Market: Panacea or Pandora's
Box?," Mimeo, Carnegie Mellon University.
Qi, J., 1994, \Bank Liquidity and Stability in an Overlapping Generations Model," Review
of Financial Studies, 7, 389{417.
Rochet, J.-C., and X. Vives, 2004, \Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort:
Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, 2-6,
1116{1145.
Sebastian, S., and M. Tyrell, 2006, \Open End Real Estate Funds - Diamond or Danger?,"
Working Paper Goethe University Frankfurt.
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
Contact information for orders: 
 
Professor Dr. Reinhard H. Schmidt 
Wilhelm Merton Professur für  
Internationales Bank- und Finanzwesen 
Mertonstr. 17 
Postfach 11 19 32 / HPF66 
D-60054 Frankfurt/Main 
 
Tel.: +49-69-798-28269 
Fax: +49-69-798-28272 
e-mail: merton@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de 
http://www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de 
With kind support from  
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe Hessen-Thüringen. 